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Foreword 
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) established the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering 
(AF CSE) at its Wright Patterson AFB campus in 2003. With academic oversight by a 
subcommittee on Systems Engineering (SE), chaired by then-Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex 
Levis, the AF CSE was tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept 
definition, acquisition, and sustainment. The committee drafted an initial case outline and 
learning objectives, and suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall 
analysis. 
The Department of Defense is exponentially increasing the acquisition of joint complex 
systems that deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter. Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining 
robust, high-quality, affordable solutions. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the 
need to mature a sound Systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. Gaining an 
understanding of the past and distilling learning principles that are then shared with others 
through our formal education and practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous 
improvement. 
The AF CSE has published nine case studies thus far including the A-10, KC-135 
Simulator, Global Hawk, C-5A, F-111, Hubble Telescope, Theater Battle Management Core 
System, International Space Station and Global Positioning System (GPS). All case studies are 
available on the AF CSE website [http://www.afit.edu/cse]. These cases support academic 
instruction on SE within military service academies, civilian and military graduate schools, 
industry continuing education programs, and those practicing SE in the field. Each of the case 
studies is comprised of elements of success as well as examples of SE decisions that, in 
hindsight, were not optimal. Both types of elements are useful for learning. 
Along with discovering historical facts, we have conducted key interviews with program 
managers and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the prime and 
various subcontractors. From this information, we have concluded that the discipline needed to 
implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to 
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions. We look forward to your comments 
on this PAVE LOW case study and our other AF CSE published studies. 
 
CAPT TIMOTHY J. DUENING, USN 
Acting Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government. 
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1 Systems Engineering Principles 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these 
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on 
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of 
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that 
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with 
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the 
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost 
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses 
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the 
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the 
conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has a long history. Examples can be found 
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as 
well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes. Throughout the many decades during which 
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools 
have been developed, documented, and applied. 
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging 
during any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements. Second, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the 
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And third, 
the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities in all 
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system 
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to 
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying 
the requirement or set of requirements. 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process 
to establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, 
legacy system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs. 
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas. 
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is 
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex system of systems. Once a 
solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to 
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ensure satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), 
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes 
place well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented 
in the literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution 
of the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, 
guides, and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), 
Electronic Industries Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They show the process as 
it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted in Figure 1. It should be noted that this 
model is not accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the 
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces. Formal models such as these did not 
appear until after the HH-53H/MH-53J PAVE LOW III program had finished production, but 
many of the processes were already in practice with both the government and contractor 
workforces during the time of MH-53M PAVE LOW IV development. 
 
Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by DAU 
1.2 DoD Directive 5000 Series 
During President Richard Nixon’s first term, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird faced 
congressional attempts to lower defense spending. The cause was the Vietnam War and the 
rising cost of defense acquisition, as well as emerging energy and environmental programs. Laird 
and David Packard, his deputy, recognized the need for a mechanism to control and manage 
spending especially with the coming fiscal constraint. In May 1969, Packard formed the Defense 
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Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to give advice on the acquisition of major 
weapon systems. It was chartered to review major milestones as well as conduct occasional 
management reviews. One year later in 1970,i Packard issued a policy memorandum that was to 
become the foundation for the DoD 5000 series of documentsii which were first issued in 1971, 
and as of January 2008 had been reissued 10 times. The original purpose of the DoD 5000 series 
was to improve the management of acquisition programs and included policy to streamline 
management, decentralize execution, and use appropriate management structures.1 The 1971 
issue of the DoD 5000 series established the following program considerations (abbreviated 
here) pertaining to progression of a program through the acquisition process.2
1. System need shall be clearly established in operational terms, with appropriate limits, and 
shall be challenged throughout the acquisition process…Wherever feasible, operational needs 
shall be satisfied through the use of existing military or commercial hardware… 
 
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of acquisition and ownership… 
Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost and schedule… 
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principle design parameter… 
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to assure that the demonstration of 
actual achievement is the pacing function… Schedules and funding profiles shall be 
structured to accommodate unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without 
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency. 
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed… Models, mock-ups, and system 
hardware will be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level. 
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A determination of operational 
suitability, including logistics support requirements, will be made prior to large scale 
production commitments… 
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including risk… 
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor’s capability to develop a 
necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis… 
9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide information which is 
essential to effective management control… Documentation shall be generated in the 
minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management needs. 
1.3 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop the aircraft 
                                               
 
i 1970 was also the year that the MAC ROC 19-70 was issued for the requirement for an “integrated system to 
enable a rescue vehicle to perform search and rescue under conditions of total darkness and/or adverse weather in all 
geographical areas…” Hence, the Pave Low program was born. 
ii DoD Directive 5000.1 and its accompanying DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
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and systems of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the 
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. Notwithstanding, the cost 
and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed 
programs and ones with less-than-stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 1990s, 
large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule. Aerospace 
industry primes were becoming larger and more geographically and culturally distributed and 
worked diligently to establish common systems engineering practices across their enterprises. 
However, these common practices must be understood and be useful both within the enterprise 
and across multiple corporations and vendor companies because of the mega-trend of teaming in 
large (and some small) programs. It is essential that the systems engineering process affect 
integration, balance, allocation, and verification and be useful to the entire program team down 
to the design and interface level. 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS) 
context, network-centric warfare and operations, an increased attention to human systems 
integration, and the rapid growth in information technology. These factors are driving a more 
sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and capable features, along with 
new tools and procedures. One area of increased focus of the systems engineering process is the 
informational systems architectural definitions used during system analysis. This process, 
described in the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF)3
1.4 Case Studies 
, emphasizes greater reliance on 
reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented characteristics. 
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system and system-of-
systems projects is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past. 
Examination of systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can 
provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process. It was this 
thinking that led to the initiation of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case study 
effort, as well as the present continuation of that effort. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles. They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The 
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple 
professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied 
functional data will be emphasized. When they are taken together, the student is provided real-
world, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule, and 
performance.  
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The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles will be highlighted, 
with special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering 
practices. Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition 
management and learning principles, to include whether: 
• every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer; 
• effective requirements analysis was applied; 
• consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards was 
applied; 
• effective test planning was accomplished; 
• there were effective major technical program reviews; 
• continuous risk assessments and management was implemented; 
• there were reliable cost estimates and policies; 
• they used disciplined application of configuration management; 
• a well-defined system boundary was defined; 
• they used disciplined methodologies for complex systems ; 
• human systems integration was accomplished; 
• problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the larger operational 
environment. 
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or system 
of systems. Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into detailed design 
requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to the 
development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and balance the 
requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its life 
cycle. Systems engineering case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to 
achieve this balance, which include: 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface between the operational user and 
developer (acquirer) essential to translate the needs into the performance requirements for 
the system and subsystems. 
• The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering to 
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
• The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as 
both internal and external. This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the 
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new 
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and government 
staffing levels. 
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1.5 Framework for Analysis 
The Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case studies present learning principles 
specific to each program, but utilize the Friedman-Sage framework4
The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role in developing case 
studies in systems engineering and systems management, especially case studies that involve 
systems acquisition. The Friedman-Sage framework is a nine row by three column matrix shown 
in Table 2. 
 to organize the assessment 
of the application of the systems engineering process. The systems engineering case studies 
published by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) employed the Friedman-Sage 
construct and matrix as the baseline assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems 
engineering process for the topic program. 
Table 1.5-1. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared  
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and 
Management 
   
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem Detailed 
Design and Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post 
Deployment 
   
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management  
   
I. System and Program Management    
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 2 represent phases in the systems engineering 
lifecycle: 
A. Requirements definition and management 
B. Systems architecting and conceptual design 
C. System and subsystem detailed design and implementation 
D. Systems and interface integration 
E. Validation and verification 
F. Deployment and post deployment 
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Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support: 
G. Life cycle support 
H. Risk assessment and management 
I. System and program management 
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman–Sage framework suggests 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the 
process. Most other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix 
appear to be subsets of one of these. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework 
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared 
responsibilities between the government and the contractor. In teaching systems engineering in 
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and responsibilities of the 
government and industry activities. While the government has responsibility in all 9 concept 
domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sikorsky MH-53M PAVE LOW IV 
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2 PAVE LOW System Description 
2.1 Background 
The Sikorsky HH/MH-53iii
United States Air Force
 PAVE LOW series served as long-range Combat Search and 
Rescue (CSAR) and Special operations helicopters for the . The series 
consisted of advanced and upgraded models of the HH-53B/C Super Jolly Green Giant, which 
were derived from the CH-53A Sea Stallion flown by the U.S. Marine Corps. The HH-53B/C 
was initially developed to supplement the Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green Giant in the CSAR role 
during the Vietnam War. After an extensive modification program to provide night/adverse 
weather capability, the aircraft was redesignated as the HH-53H PAVE LOW III. Later, after 
inheriting an additional role as a Special operations platform, it was redesignated the MH-53H. 
Upgrades in mission and defensive equipment for its expanded role produced the MH-53J PAVE 
LOW III Enhanced. The last and most advanced variant was the MH-53M PAVE LOW IV. 
After 29 years of service, the PAVE LOW fleet was retired in September 2008 and was replaced 
primarily by the Boeing MH-47E Special operations variant of the CH-47 Chinook helicopter 
flown by the U.S. Army. 
Table 2.1-1. Key PAVE LOW Milestones and Events  
                                               
 
iiiThe MH-53 variants flown by the Air Force are not to be confused with the MH-53E Sea Dragon flown by the 
U.S. Navy for Airborne Mine Countermeasures. Air Force variants primarily conduct overland missions, while 
Navy variants serve strictly as maritime platforms. 
Year Milestone/Event 
15 Mar 67 First flight of newly-designated HH-53B Super Jolly Green Giant; deliveries began in June 
03 Apr 67 PACAF identified requirement for a night recovery system in Southeast Asia Operational 
Requirement (SEAOR) No. 114 
14 Sep 67 First two examples of HH-53B arrived in Southeast Asia followed by six more 
25 Apr 68 Effort initiated to introduce a night rescue capability on the HH-53B in the form of the Limited Night Recover System (LNRS) 
May 68 Contract awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for an improved Super Jolly Green Giant, the HH-53C 
30 Aug 68 First HH-53C delivered, featuring more powerful engines, additional armor for flight crew, and improved radio communications equipment 
23 Oct 68 Development Directive No. 231 authorizes Pave Star program, intended to eliminate shortcomings of LNRS 
22 Jun 70 Pave Star cancelled due to cost overruns; Pave Imp program initiated for development of a true Night Recovery System (NRS) 
23 Jul 70 MAC ROC 19-70 entitled "Night/Adverse Weather Rescue System" initiated 
Jun 72 TF/TA radar installed in an NRS-equipped HH-53B under PAVE LOW I program 
20 Jul 72 PAVE LOW II program authorized to determine baseline data for specifications of an operational 
system to fulfill MAC ROC 19-70 
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Year Milestone/Event 
30 Jan 74 PAVE LOW III program initiated by Program Management Directive (PMD); FLIR sensor and 
INS integrated with TF/TA radar and fitted to YHH-53H for testing 
22 Feb 74 Teledyne Systems Company registered an official protest against PL III program office concerning 
sole-source procurement from a different company 
Apr 75 First PL III roll-out scheduled; accident occurred due to faulty wiring 
18 Sep 75 Official PL III prototype roll-out ceremony held at WPAFB, OH 
Mar 76 Prototype development test and evaluation flight test report issued 
29 Apr 77 PMD issued to ASD authorizing procurement and installation of PL III system in eight HH-53C 
aircraft; NARF at NAS Pensacola, FL awarded PL III modification/installation contract 
23 Aug 77 NARF receives first HH-53C for conversion to PL III configuration 
Nov 77 PL III subsystem contracts awarded 
13 Mar 79 Roll-out ceremony for first operational PL III aircraft held at NAS Pensacola 
Apr 79 First production PAVE LOW enters service with Military Airlift Command (MAC) at Kirtland 
AFB, NM for qualification and acceptance testing 
31 Jul 79 PL III drawing baseline declared; production flight test plan approved 
11 Jan 80 First real-world rescue mission by operational HH-53H took place 15 nm west of Albuquerque 
NM 
Jan 80 Flight test complete 
May 80 PAVE LOW fleet transferred to Tactical Air Command (TAC) in preparation for deployment and 
rescue of American hostages in Iran 
Jul 81 Flight test report issued 
Mar 83 PAVE LOW fleet transferred back to MAC 
Jun 85 PMD issued to Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) to replace two PL IIIs lost in 
training exercises 
Jun 86 WR-ALC accepts program transfer; mission design series designator changed from "HH" to "MH" 
to reflect the expanded Special operations roles and missions inherited by the PAVE LOW 
17 Jul 87 First MH-53J rolled out; externally same--internally upgraded with integrated digital avionics, 
upgraded radar and night vision systems, improved secure communications, additional titanium 
armor, provisions for an internally-carried 600 gal fuel bladder, and an uprated transmission 
17 Jan 91 Four MH-53J PAVE LOW III helicopters from the 20th Special Operations Squadron led two 
flights of AH-64A Apaches to make the first strike of the war 
1997 MH-53M PAVE LOW IV enhanced threat detection and defense capabilities; modification of 25 
aircraft took place in 1999 and 2001 
Oct 01 MH-53M aircraft fly long-range Special operations missions into Afghanistan during the first days 
of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Mar 03 PAVE LOW aircraft once again fly numerous long-range, high-value missions, this time into Iraq 
as Operation Iraqi Freedom begins  
26 Sep 08 Final operational combat mission for the PAVE LOW in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
17 Oct 08 Formal retirement ceremony held at Hurlburt Field, Florida 
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2.2 Air Force H-53 Variants5
Table 2.2-1 Air Force H-53 Variants 
 
Variant Mission Years of Service Remarks 
• CH-53A Super Jolly 
Green Giant 
Special Operations 1966 - 1970 Loaned from U.S. Marine Corps; used for covert operations in Laos and North Vietnam 
• CH-53C Super Jolly 
Green Giant 
Special Operations 
and heavy-lift 1968 - 1990 
Replaced CH-53A for covert operations; later 
used for heavy-lift operations and training 
• HH-53B Super Jolly 
Green Giant 
Combat Search and 
Rescue (CSAR) 1967 – 1990 
First operational CSAR variant; fitted with an 
in-flight refueling probe, external fuel tanks, 
a rescue hoist, and protective armor 
• HH-53C Super Jolly 
Green Giant 
CSAR 1968 – 1990 
Improved CSAR variant; fitted with 
additional armor, improved communications 
gear, and defensive systems 
• YHH-53H Black 
Knight 
Test Bed 1973 - 1977 Used to test PAVE LOW II/III systems; served as final PAVE LOW III prototype iv
• HH-53H PAVE LOW 
III 
 
CSAR 1979 - 1986 First operational PAVE LOW variant 
• MH-53H PAVE LOW 
III 
CSAR and Special 
Operations 1986 - 1990 
Re-designation to denote added Special 
Operations role 
• MH-53J PAVE LOW 
IIIE (Enhanced) 
CSAR and Special 
Operations 
1987 – 2008 
Improved variant with integrated digital 
avionics, an upgraded transmission, more 
powerful engines, and various enhanced 
mission and defensive systems 
• MH-53M PAVE LOW 
IV 
CSAR and Special 
Operations 
1999 - 2008 Upgraded variant with greatly improved threat detection and defensive systems 
• TH-53A 
CSAR and Special 
Operations Flight 
Training 
1989 - 2008 MH-53J/M training variant (modified U.S. Marine Corps CH-53A) 
Note 1:  The PAVE LOW I system was tested on an operational HH-53B rather than on a prototype aircraft.  The 
system never reached production or operational service. 
Note 2:  All Air Force H-53 variants remaining in service after 1990 were converted to the MH-53J PAVE LOW IIIE 
configuration, some of which were later upgraded to PAVE LOW IV configuration beginning in 1999. 
 
  
                                               
 
iv The Pave Low I system was tested on a standard HH-53B and never saw production or operational service. 
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2.3 Specifications: MH-53J PAVE LOW III 
General characteristics 
• Crew: 6 (two pilots, two flight engineers and two aerial gunners) 
• Capacity: 32 personnel (55 in alternate configuration) 
• Length (Fuselage): 67.2 ft 
• Length (Rotors Turning): 88.25 ft 
• Height (Overall): 24.9 ft 
• Main rotor diameter (6 blades): 72.25 ft 
• Tail rotor diameter (4 blades):  16 ft 
• Empty weight: 32,000 lb 
• Max takeoff weight: 46,000 lb (50,000 lb in wartime) 
• Power plant: 2× General Electric T64-GE-100 turboshaft, 4,330 shaft horsepower (shp) 
each 
Performance 
• Maximum speed: 170 knots (196 mph) 
• Cruise speed: 150 kt (173 mph) 
• Range: 600 nmi - can be extended with in-flight refueling 
• Service ceiling: 20,400 ft 
 
Figure 3. Sikorsky MH-53J PAVE LOW III 3-View Drawing 
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3 The PAVE LOW Story  
By nature, the tactics, techniques, and procedures that define Special operations require 
the use of highly specialized equipment to execute what are undeniably some of the most daring 
and hazardous missions in modern warfare. One such example is the Sikorsky MH-53 PAVE 
LOW, arguably the premier Special operations helicopter in the world. Even in the wake of its 
withdrawal from service in 2008, the extraordinary performance and unique capabilities it 
brought to the battlefield remain second to none. To fully appreciate the impressive capabilities 
embodied by the PAVE LOW, one must understand its heritage, the roots of which began during 
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.6
3.1 The Challenge of Night Rescue 
 
During the Vietnam War, the use of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery by a 
very determined enemy resulted in the loss of thousands of U.S. aircraft. Accordingly, Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR) forces incurred a heavy workload in recovering downed American 
airmen. As the executive agency responsible for CSAR, the Air Force had a need for a dedicated 
rescue helicopter to supplement the capable but somewhat limited Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green 
Giant. 
Recognizing the potential of the CH-53A Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopter which had 
entered service with the Marine Corps in September 1966, the Air Force borrowed two Sea 
Stallions from the Marine Corps to evaluate them for use in the CSAR role. Consideration of this 
aircraft was primarily based on the power, speed, range and internal payload capacity that it 
offered. Upon delivery of two Sea Stallions in November and December 1966, Air Force 
evaluation of the type was carried out at Eglin AFB, Florida. At the conclusion of a favorable 
evaluation, the first flight of the newly-designated HH-53B Super Jolly Green Giant (usually just 
shortened to “Super Jolly”) was achieved on March 15, 1967, and deliveries to the Air Force 
began in June. Key features incorporated into the B-model included an extendable in-flight 
refueling probe, jettisonable auxiliary fuel tanks, a rescue hoist, improved avionics, and 
defensive armament. The first two examples reached Southeast Asia on September 14, 1967, 
followed by six more over the next few months. 
 
Figure 4.  Marine Corps CH-53A   Figure 5. Air Force HH-53B 
Operational use of the HH-53B proved successful, but revealed several areas for 
improvement which led to the rapid introduction of the HH-53C, the first of which was delivered 
on August 30, 1968. The C-model made use of more powerful engines, additional armor for the 
flight crew and improved radio communications gear. This improved model of the Super Jolly 
Green Giant was rapidly deployed to the Southeast Asia Theater of operations where it proved to 
be even more effective in CSAR. Still, despite the impressive capabilities that the HH-53B/C 
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brought to bear, it remained deficient in one major area‒ the ability to effectively perform the 
mission at night, especially in adverse weather conditions. The Air Force had actually identified 
the need for an aircraft capable of performing personnel recovery at night and in all kinds of 
weather as early as 1965, even before the HH-53 had entered service. 
However, other more pressing needs across the military services took precedence and this 
requirement went largely unaddressed for two years. The inherent risks associated with entering 
hostile territory by air to recover downed airmen were obvious; attempting to do so at night was 
borderline suicidal from a flight safety standpoint. Therefore, CSAR operations were typically 
carried out only in daylight hours. Generally speaking, the only exceptions to this were the 
precious few occasions when airmen went down in the most benign and relatively risk-free 
environments in which the chances of enemy contact were slim. Around-the-clock air operations 
resulted in a number of downed aircraft during the hours of darkness, the crews of which were 
usually forced to try and evade capture in enemy held territory until a rescue attempt could be 
mounted at daybreak. Unfortunately, many of them were unsuccessful and ended up being 
captured or killed while waiting for sunrise. 
To further complicate matters, the large array of aircraft needed to successfully carry out 
and support a rescue mission required extensive planning and coordination among all involved, 
including the other military services. Careful orchestration by upper command and control 
elements was necessary to deconflict the sheer volume of aircraft using the same airspace. 
Furthermore, such missions put an inordinate number of personnel and resources at risk. All of 
the aforementioned factors, combined with mounting losses of personnel and aircraft as combat 
intensified, made the requirement for a more effective CSAR platform more urgent, leading it to 
be spelled out more emphatically in Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) Number 
114 dated April 03, 1967. This requirement called for an aircraft capable of penetrating hostile 
territory with little or no support, independently locating and retrieving the survivor(s), and 
affecting a safe and rapid egress back to friendly territory, all under the cover of darkness in all 
kinds of weather. It became time critical that such an aircraft be fielded as quickly as possible. 
The demonstrated capability and performance of the HH-53B/C in the CSAR arena during 
daytime made it logical to simply modify these aircraft, rather than attempt to develop and 
produce a whole new aircraft for the mission. 
 
Figure 6. Early Night Vision Goggles Figure 7. Infrared view of jeep  
Although the need for an all-aspect air rescue capability had existed for decades, it was 
only during the years of the Vietnam War that the technology finally came within reach to make 
nighttime adverse weather rescue operations by air a reality. Night vision technology was still in 
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its infancy, but it was maturing at a steady pace and becoming more commonplace on the 
battlefield as the war progressed. Efforts to exploit night vision capability for CSAR resulted in a 
number of programs, some of which overlapped and ran concurrently as research proceeded at a 
feverish pace. The first effort to introduce a night rescue capability on the HH-53 was initiated 
on April 25, 1968, and involved a system known as the Limited Night Recovery System (LNRS). 
This system was comprised of a Low Light Level Television (LLLTV) camera, an infrared (IR) 
illuminator, a Direct View Device, a Doppler navigation system, a radar altimeter and an 
Automatic Approach and Hover Coupler System. Operational testing, which was accomplished 
at Eglin AFB, consisted of 96 simulated rescue sorties. Tests clearly demonstrated the system did 
indeed provide a limited capability to accomplish night combat aircrew recoveries over a variety 
of terrain, and deployment of the system was recommended. Subsequently, incorporation of the 
LNRS on a number of HH-53s based in Thailand at Udorn Royal Thailand Air Force Base 
(RTAFB) began in November 1969. Two months later, a total of eight aircraft had received the 
modification. 
Although the LNRS added additional capability to the aircraft, its limitations were 
recognized early on and it was acknowledged to be an interim solution. Research continued 
toward fulfilling the goal of full night/adverse weather CSAR capability; only six months after 
LNRS began, an even more ambitious program was born. Running concurrently with LNRS, the 
Pave Star program had been authorized on October 23, 1968, and initiated on December 16 that 
year. Its goal was to provide a worldwide, all-weather rescue capability which effectively 
eliminated the shortcomings associated with LNRS. However, severe cost overruns resulted in 
the cancellation of Pave Star barely eighteen months after it began. As a result, a reduced 
program dubbed Pave Imp was initiated on June 22, 1970. It was intended to make use of 
improvements derived from the short-lived Pave Star program and incorporate them into a Night 
Recovery System (NRS) for the HH-53B/C, hopefully attaining the goals originally set for Pave 
Star. 
Tests were conducted in 1971 using a modified HH-53C to verify that performance of the 
Pave Imp system was at least equal to or better than that of the LNRS. Results were positive and 
combat evaluation was subsequently accomplished at Udorn RTAFB during a 90-day period. 
Although Pave Imp provided a significant increase to existing night recovery capabilities 
and it was recommended that the system continued to be utilized to the fullest extent possible, 
the team responsible for evaluating the system made it clear limitations still existed. They 
concluded efforts should continue toward developing an unrestricted all-weather night rescue 
system. 
Barely one month after efforts had begun to establish effective night vision capability 
through Pave Imp, a Required Operational Capability (ROC), designated ROC 19-70 
Night/Adverse Weather Rescue System, was established on July 23, 1970 (Appendix C). As a 
result of this, direction was given in November of that year to evaluate the use of a Forward 
Looking Radar (FLR) to provide low-level penetration capability for the HH-53. The FLR would 
work in concert with night vision systems to provide CSAR capability in total darkness under 
adverse weather conditions in all geographical areas at low level. This program, christened 
PAVE LOW, marked the beginning of a revolution in night/adverse weather CSAR capability, 
ultimately leading to what would become the pinnacle of combat rescue platforms. 
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3.2 The Rise of the PAVE LOW 
The need for low-level penetration while performing the CSAR mission was self-evident. 
However, it became obvious sole reliance on night vision to perform the task within acceptable 
flight safety margins was impractical, 
particularly given the heavy pilot 
workload, mental stress, and crew fatigue 
associated with such demanding flying. 
The PAVE LOW program aimed to 
integrate an FLR, more specifically 
Terrain-Following/Terrain Avoidance 
(TF/TA) radar, into the HH-53. This, in 
concert with night vision systems 
developed under Pave Imp, would be used 
to attain the desired capabilities. Practical 
testing and use of the two systems would 
prove their codependence upon the other; 
eventually, the two requirements would be 
merged, along with other features, into a 
single package. The initial test concept 
involved installation of a Norden 
AN/APQ-141 TF/TA radar system, which 
was under development for the Army’s 
ongoing Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne 
attack helicopter program. 
Sikorsky installed the radar, which was modified to provide manual TF/TA steering data 
to the pilot, in an NRS-equipped HH-53B in June 1972 and evaluation was completed six months 
later. Results were very encouraging, but since the radar was merely a flight test example versus 
a production-ready model, further development costs and program risks to bring this particular 
system up to production standards were ultimately deemed too high, so the AN/APQ-141 was 
eliminated from consideration in favor of one already in production. Even before evaluation of 
the TF/TA radar was completed under the original PAVE LOW program – now referred to as 
PAVE LOW I to differentiate between it and the next iteration of the program – PAVE LOW II 
(PL II) was proposed on July 20, 1972. It was envisioned as a developmental/production/ 
modification program which aimed to address three distinct limitations identified in previous 
programs: inability to avoid terrain and exposure to hostile radar/sensor-directed threats at low 
level; insufficient accuracy in the navigation system to reach the rescue area at low level; and 
inability to precisely locate the survivor(s) and hold a hover over his/her position. Again using a 
modified HH-53B, these deficiencies were addressed through the installation of a variety of 
systems including: a new self-contained navigation system known as a Heading Reference 
System using Doppler technology; a Projected Map Display System (PMDS); Flight Director 
Instruments; an Electronic Location Finder (ELF); and a Hover Coupler (HC). Research and 
Development (R&D) efforts in PL II were initiated to determine baseline data for specifications 
of an operational system. The number of modifications made to the aircraft warranted a new 
designation and the test aircraft became the YHH-53H, with the “Y” prefix to be dropped on the 
eventual operational model. The flight test and evaluation program, which took place in 1973 at 
Figure 8. YHH-53H Black Knight 
Figure 9. Lockheed AH-56ACheyenne 
 
 
16 
Edwards AFB, California, demonstrated a significant increase in the ability to perform night 
rescue. More specifically, it confirmed the feasibility of integrating all primary systems with the 
existing Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) to maintain a hover over personnel equipped 
with a survival radio. Although deficiencies were found, evaluators were favorably impressed 
and development of a full prototype night rescue system based on those tested under PL II was 
recommended. By this time, American forces were being withdrawn from Vietnam, but the 
night/adverse weather CSAR requirement remained relevant. 
3.3 PAVE LOW II and III – Development of an In-House Prototype 
Even before testing and evaluation of the YHH-53H had begun, the Directorate of 
Combat Systems (under which the PL II program and all other aircraft weapon systems were 
ultimately managed) submitted a development plan in August 1972 which encompassed a total 
expenditure of $14.2M for the modification of eight NRS-equipped helicopters to PL II 
configuration. These costs were based upon the predicted performance of the system, despite the 
fact it had not yet been flown and evaluated as an integrated system. However, program costs 
had risen substantially. After completion of the flight test and evaluation program, cost estimates 
had escalated to more than $20M, at which the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David C. 
Jones, asked, “Can we do it cheaper?” The gunship SPO at the Aeronautical Systems Division, 
Wright-Patterson AFB, which had just completed a successful in-house gunship program, stated 
they could develop the system using in-house expertise and off-the-shelf equipment for $3.2M. 
Under this revised plan, the next phase in development, dubbed PAVE LOW III (PL III), was 
initiated by a PMD on January 30, 1974 (Appendix D). 
The AF gave the SPO the nod to transition to PL III development in-house in late 1973 
and the PMD was initiated on January 30, 1974. The modification of the PL II prototype to PL 
III configuration was begun the following month. The PL III program was modeled heavily on 
the AC-130 gunship program. Seven gunships had been modified and sent to Vietnam with 
measured success. The gunship program demonstrated that an in-house mod program could 
work. The gunship program was winding down in 1973 when its Director, Colonel Ronald W. 
Terry, believed his staff could also develop the prototype PAVE LOW helicopter. “It is doubtful 
that the PL III program could have been accomplished with any other group of Aeronautical 
Systems Division personnel except those that had been in the gunship SPO.” Working closely 
with HQ MAC, the PL SPO integrated the TF/TA radar, Inertial Navigation System (INS), 
computers, signal generators, map displays, and Attitude Direction Indicators (ADI) into a 
prototype helicopter, the YHH-53H. As a result of the successful evaluation of the PL III, a 
revised PMD was issued April 29, 1977, authorizing procurement and installation of the PL III 
system in eight HH-53Cs. Approval was also given to modify the prototype to production 
standards, making a total of nine HH-53H aircraft. All structural modifications and installation of 
subsystems and components were carried out at the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF), Naval 
Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida. This was done to mitigate costs and risks in regard to 
technical and logistics support. 
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The concept of prototyping is not new to systems engineering. However, there are mixed 
feelings about prototyping throughout the DoD. (A-10 CS p.4)  In particular, these mixed views 
center around prototyping in the 
competitive phase prior to full-
scale development. Competitive 
prototyping can help mitigate 
technical and life cycle cost risk 
by delaying costly commitment 
decisions for full-scale 
development until after the 
basic design has been 
demonstrated and cost estimates 
have matured. (A-10 CS p.4) 
The Air Force has had prototype 
“fly-offs” in previous 
developments (e.g., the A-X 
program, the Lightweight Fighter [LWF] program, and the Advanced Tactical Fighter [ATF] 
program to name a few). The typical downside of this approach is that development costs rise 
and schedules lengthen. In the case of the PL III, however, because the development costs were 
so high and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force asked if it could be done cheaper (or else cancel 
the effort), the Air Force decided to take on the risk of the cost of development based on a 
similar successful program (the AC-130 gunship). Also, in the case of the PL III, and later the PL 
IV, effective prototyping was accomplished at the subsystem and component level. 
One problem recognized by the PL III SPO managers during the development of PL III 
was the lack of mission-oriented operational experience within the SPO. The same problem had 
been encountered during the AC-130 gunship program. The difficulty was much more noticeable 
in the PL program as no Air Force officer in the SPO had experience flying helicopters or any 
familiarity with the technology needed to perform a rescue mission. The SPO managers 
discussed this problem with the customer, MAC. The SPO wanted someone who would have 
adequate rank to be able to effect changes if required within the SPO, and to be able to discuss 
problems with decision makers at the HQ MAC level. He needed experience in staff work as 
well as an understanding of engineering. He also needed experience in rescue during the 
Vietnam War and qualifications as an HH-53 pilot. To meet the needs of the SPO, MAC 
assigned Lt Col Frank J. Pehr to Wright-Patterson AFB. Lt Col Pehr, who had years of 
experience in HH-53 helicopters and who had been on rescue missions in combat, was very 
much an advocate of the PL mission. He assisted in designing the prototype, piloting the aircraft 
during flight tests, and evaluating its operational usability. He was also involved in the 
production decisions, flew the aircraft during production flight tests, accepted the aircraft for 
MAC, became the PL III Training Squadron Commander, and even went on temporary duty to 
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) when the aircraft were transferred. “He knew more about the 
PL III system than any other operational pilot in the Air Force.”1 
The gunship program was winding down in 1973 and its Director, Colonel Terry, 
believed his staff could also develop the prototype PL helicopter. The gunship program used 
USAF personnel bearing the integrating responsibility for fielding gunship aircraft. This type of 
Figure 10. General Dynamics YF-16 and Northrop YF-17 Lightweight 
Fighter prototypes 
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effort had not been accomplished at WPAFB since World War II and it was extremely high risk. 
The gunship SPO was organized slightly differently from the normal ASD SPOs at that time. 
The major differences were in the personnel and their responsibilities. There were four groups of 
“specialists.” Colonel Terry had a staff of one civilian, one military officer, and a secretary. 
There was a test organization of approximately four people who were in charge of flight testing. 
There was also a large procurement section and a large engineering section. There were no stand-
alone “managers.” The engineers actually worked as engineering managers and were responsible 
for the subsystems and for the logistics problems associated with the subsystems. These gunship 
personnel and the model SPO developed by Colonel Terry transitioned to the PAVE LOW 
program in late 1973. 
The ability to acquire personnel who possess the desired experience and skill sets needed 
in the new program can reduce the learning curve and increase the efficiency of the program 
office. This was the experience of the newly-formed PAVE LOW SPO at WPAFB as gunship 
personnel were able to transition to the PAVE LOW program and bring with them the skill sets 
needed to accomplish an in-house weapon system development. Also, the addition of a team 
member from the user, MAC, early in the program, ensured customer involvement throughout 
the life of the program. This enhanced the usability of the PAVE LOWs for the aircrew. 
The PL III program added additional equipment to the PL II. Along with the equipment 
installed under PL II, an AN/AAQ-10 Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor and an Inertial 
Navigation System (INS) were added to the YHH-53H. The FLIR was selected to replace the 
previous LLLTV due to lower costs, smaller size and superior performance. In addition, a new 
TF/TA radar system was chosen. In order to perform the rescue mission in a combat 
environment, at night, and under adverse weather conditions as described by the MAC ROC, one 
of the most important contributing subsystems was the multimode radar (Gambone, 1988).1 
During the early planning of the PL III prototype, all DoD radars were thoroughly investigated. 
The only system that could fulfill the mission requirements was the Texas Instruments - 
manufactured AN/APQ-126, a multimode TF/TA radar system developed in the early 1970s for 
use in the LTV A-7D/E Corsair II fixed-wing attack aircraft, flown by both the Air Force and the 
Navy respectively. 
 
     Figure 11. LTV A-7E Corsair II (Navy variant) Figure 12. AN/APQ-126 TF/TA radar 
This radar performed all of the basic functions which were required for the PL III, 
particularly TF/TA and ground mapping. The radar, however, was designed to operate in the A-7 
and to perform its functions within the A-7’s operational high-speed flight envelope. This 
performance envelope was, of course, significantly different than that of the HH-53. This caused 
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some difficulties for PL III. The PL III needed to have the capability of flying its mission at a 
minimum altitude of 200 feet above ground level (AGL). However, the true combat rescue 
mission requirements called for the aircraft to fly safely at 100 feet AGL. Since this 100-foot 
altitude would be flown in the TF/TA mode, the radar was the primary subsystem to make this 
effort successful. In looking at how the A-7s used the radar, it was found that pilots seldom used 
the TF/TA mode at all. In addition, when they did use the TF/TA mode, they did not fly below 
500 feet AGL. Texas Instruments was reluctant to certify the use of a modified AN/APQ-126 at 
100 feet AGL. After some simulations of low-altitude approaches to mountains and other terrain 
features, Texas Instruments agreed to modify the radar to fulfill the 100-foot requirement. The 
modified version of this system, which became the AN/APQ-158, equipped the PAVE LOW 
during its entire service life. The AN/APQ-158 was the only major system to have an organic 
depot, namely the NARF at Jacksonville, FL (Appendix E). The digital computer, FLIR, Doppler 
radar and Symbol Generator systems were repaired at the manufacturer’s facilities. (Gambone, 
1988)1 
All of the specialized mission systems in the PAVE LOW were collectively integrated 
through a central avionics computer. System design, integration and modification were all 
accomplished using “in-house” Air Force personnel, funding and facilities, coupled with off-the-
shelf subsystems to reduce total acquisition costs. Sixteen months after the program began, the 
newly modified aircraft made its First Flight under the PL III program in May 1975. In order to 
determine the effectiveness of the systems installed, the YHH- 53H was tested extensively under 
a combined Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E) / Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
(IOT&E) program from June 9, 1975 through September 30, 1977. During this time, the test 
program was interrupted briefly to accommodate a formal roll-out ceremony on September 18, 
1975, at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, home of the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) which 
oversaw the PAVE LOW program. A crucial aspect of the evaluation involved testing in a 
number of environments with experienced operational flight crews under realistic mission 
profiles. One of the locations selected for this was Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. During testing 
there, one crew was unexpectedly afforded an opportunity for a real-world rescue when they 
heard radio traffic regarding the crash of an HH-3 in a canyon located south of the base. 
Departing the test range, they used their on-board systems to race to the area and locate the 
downed helicopter and its crew within ten minutes. 
At the conclusion of the evaluation, 
not only were all major objectives 
accomplished, but the final results were very 
impressive. All crewmembers who 
participated in the evaluation indicated 
unequivocally that the PL III system provided 
the first true capability to accomplish the 
CSAR mission under conditions of total 
darkness and marginal weather. 
Recommendations for improvement were 
made, however, regarding the equipment used 
to pinpoint and positively identify the 
survivor(s) on the ground. Nevertheless, the 
system had demonstrated an unprecedented 
Figure 13. Nighttime view of Pave Low 
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ability to accomplish what had been virtually impossible less than a decade earlier. As a result of 
the successful evaluation of the PL III, a revised PMD was issued on April 29, 1977, (Appendix 
F) authorizing procurement and installation of the PL III system in eight HH-53C aircraft. 
Approval was also given to modify the prototype to production configuration, making a total of 9 
HH-53H aircraft. 
An RFP was sent out and contractors placed bids on the production program. However, 
the winner’s bid, submitted by Sikorsky Aircraft, far exceeded the budget. The Naval Air 
Rework Facility (NARF) at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida submitted a competitor 
proposal. Shortly thereafter, PL SPO personnel visited the NARF and met with Navy personnel. 
It was decided that the NARF could perform the PL III modifications and all structural 
modifications and installation of subsystems were carried out at the facility. This was done to 
reduce costs and risks in regard to technical and logistics support since all major overhauls and 
depot maintenance on H-53 helicopters throughout the military services were already being 
performed there. There were several advantages to this arrangement. Since the NARF was a DoD 
activity, the PL III SPO did not have to participate in the usual contractual exercises so that the 
effort was significantly reduced in scope. Unlike many Government-contractor joint efforts, the 
relationship between the SPO and the NARF was very cordial and non-adversarial. The NARF 
personnel were expert craftsmen in the fabrication and installation of aircraft parts. If any 
activity was left out of the contract, it was never a major problem to get the work done. 
(Gambone, 1988)1 
The NARF received its first HH-53C 
for conversion on August 23, 1977. Nineteen 
months later, on March 13, 1979, a formal 
ceremony was held at NAS Pensacola during 
which the first operational PL III helicopter 
was rolled out in front of an enthusiastic crowd 
of distinguished military and civilian 
personnel. At the time, the aircraft had been 
given the unofficial moniker “Black Knight,” a 
name coined by personnel in the Specialized 
System Program Office at ASD which 
managed the PAVE LOW program. They had 
picked it as a reference to their legacy of work 
in years past on other nighttime-oriented military aircraft, such as the Lockheed AC-130 Spectre 
fixed-wing gunship. Additionally, the original test aircraft for PL II and III, wearing an overall 
flat black paint scheme, had been adorned with an emblem consisting of a chess knight centered 
within a white circle. However, the Air Force never adopted the name or the symbol, nor did it 
ever bestow an official nickname upon the aircraft. Although the PAVE LOW name technically 
referred to the specialized systems installed on-board the HH-53, the term soon became 
synonymous with the aircraft itself. As modification of each airframe was completed, the 
helicopters were delivered to Military Airlift Command (MAC) for qualification and acceptance 
testing, beginning in April 1979. From there, the PL III entered service at Kirtland AFB. The 
total number of HH-53H PAVE LOWs to enter service was eleven, nine of which were 
converted from a mix of HH-53B/Cs, and additional rebuilt CH-53Cs. 
Figure 14. Head-on view of HH-53H Pave Low III 
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While at Kirtland, the first real world rescue mission to be flown by an operational HH-
53H took place on January 11, 1980, approximately 15 nm west of Albuquerque. The successful 
response to a privately-owned light aircraft which crashed in adverse weather at night marked the 
first use of an operational PL III helicopter. Although this mission took place in peacetime, the 
potential for a combat mission surfaced only a few months later. World events made the mission 
assignment to MAC short-lived, as the ongoing Iran hostage crisis prompted the Air Force to 
transfer all PL III aircraft and resources to Tactical Air Command (TAC) in May 1980 and move 
all PL helicopters to Hurlburt Field, FL. After the failed attempt to rescue the hostages only a 
month earlier under Operation Eagle Claw, leaders had considered use of the PL III in a second 
rescue attempt. However, a second attempt proved unnecessary as the hostages were released 
before a second operation could be implemented. Nevertheless, the functionality of the PAVE 
LOW system had been proven and the Air Force had finally attained a much-needed capability. 
3.4 Expanding Missions and Capabilities 
Consideration of the PAVE LOW for rescuing the American citizens held captive in Iran 
highlighted a new role for which the aircraft was ideally suited. The ability of the PAVE LOW to 
covertly penetrate hostile territory at high-speed, low-level, and long range had natural 
applications in support of Special Operations Forces. Recognizing this, the decision was made to 
expand the HH-53 mission to include infiltration/exfiltration and resupply of friendly forces deep 
within enemy-held territory. The PAVE LOW offered a degree of flexibility to the Special 
operations mission which was unmatched by fixed-wing aircraft. Its ability to take off and land 
virtually anywhere provided tacticians and planners a number of options which were previously 
unavailable. In essence, the PAVE LOW would become a true Special operations asset, 
extending well beyond the original CSAR mission requirement developed nearly two decades 
before. Accordingly, the mission design series designator was changed in 1986 from “HH” to 
“MH” to reflect the expanded roles and missions inherited by the PAVE LOW. The increased 
emphasis on Special operations justified further upgrades in mission equipment, which were 
initiated under the Constant Green program that same year. In the meantime, the MH-53H 
became fully immersed in the shadowy world of Special operations, leading it to become the first 
Air Force helicopter to be fully cleared for operation with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). As 
each MH-53H underwent modification, it emerged as an MH-53J PAVE LOW III Enhanced. 
Externally, the MH-53J was almost indistinguishable from the H-model, as most of the changes 
were internal. Features introduced with the J-model included integrated digital avionics, 
upgraded radar and night vision systems, improved secure communications, additional titanium 
armor, provisions for an internally-carried 600 gal fuel bladder, and an uprated transmission. In 
addition, more powerful engines were introduced in the form of 4,330 shp General Electric T64-
GE-100 turboshaft engines (replacing the 3,936 shp T64-GE-7A previously used). The first MH-
53J was rolled out on July 17, 1987 at the Naval Aviation Depot (formerly NARF) at NAS 
Pensacola, achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida in 1988. 
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3.4.1 The Importance of Good Configuration Control 
In 1987, it became obvious the 
configuration control for the PAVE LOW 
production program was a failure and 
something needed to be done. The Air 
Force was trying to upgrade five aircraft 
through the NARF simultaneously. The 
HH-53Bs, Cs, and Hs, 41 aircraft in total 
had 12 different configurations going into 
the NARF depot. Initially, it was 
discovered there were poor or no records 
on the current configuration of each 
aircraft undergoing modification. In order 
to ensure some level of configuration 
control, it was decided to do an audit of 
each aircraft first. The NARF was trying 
to do commodity modifications on aircraft that were all different. ARINC was hired to perform 
configuration control. ARINC developed a system for tracking each PAVE LOW by tail number 
and documented the modifications to each aircraft as they passed through the depot. ARINC 
developed a “waterfall” flowchart for configuration control of all modifications to the aircraft. 
This greatly streamlined the process and saved the program time, reduced risk, and cost. 
Training for PAVE LOW pilots and aircrew members was accomplished using a fleet of 
five TH-53As, all of which were converted Sea Stallions acquired from the Marine Corps in 
1989. By 1990, all remaining MH-53Hs had been upgraded to MH-53J standard, with an 
additional thirty-one examples being added to the inventory by way of converted HH-53Bs,  
HH-53Cs, and CH-53Cs. That same year, in a move designed to better align the MH-53J with its 
new multifaceted mission, all PAVE LOWs were transferred to the newly-formed Air Force 
Special Operations Command (AFSOC). 
  
Figure 15. MH-53J inserts Special Operations Forces 
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3.5 Suited to the Task 
The basic design of the H-53 proved more than adequate for adaptation to the CSAR and 
Special operations missions. The twin T64-GE-100 engines provided an abundance of power to 
the 72.25 ft diameter six-bladed main rotor and 
the 16 ft diameter four-bladed tail rotor. In 
addition, the dual engine arrangement provided 
an added margin of safety over single-engine 
designs. The spacious cabin could accommodate 
up to 32 personnel or a variety of cargo, 
depending on the mission, while the hydraulically 
operated rear ramp made onloading and 
offloading of cargo, equipment and personnel a 
quick and easy task. The retractable tricycle 
landing gear configuration facilitated easy taxiing 
and ground handling. Large cambered sponsons 
on either side of the lower fuselage housed 
additional internal fuel. These sponsons were fitted with cantilever fairings known as “gull 
wings,” which served as attachment points for externally mounted 650 gal auxiliary fuel tanks, 
collectively providing an unrefueled range of 
about 600 nm. If necessary, the range and 
endurance could be extended even further by 
use of an extendable in-flight refueling probe 
fitted on the starboard side of the nose. An 
automatic hydraulically-actuated blade-folding 
system for the main rotor and a folding tail 
pylon, both of which were retrofitted beginning 
in the early 1990s, facilitated stowage and 
handling when transporting the PAVE LOW 
aboard a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy or Boeing C-17 
Globemaster III. 
Despite its large size, the PAVE LOW was incredibly fast and maneuverable, with a top 
speed of 170 kt. Its ability to perform nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight in rolling and mountainous 
terrain, day or night, in any weather, was made possible not 
only by its advanced sensor suite, but also by its inherent 
agility. Pilots would typically fly as low as 50 ft over the 
highest obstacle in order to avoid detection on radar and to 
minimize exposure of the aircraft to enemy air defenses, a 
technique known as terrain masking. Despite a gross weight 
of up to 50,000 lb, the PAVE LOW’s robust construction 
and more-than-adequate power margins allowed pilots to 
enjoy a virtually unrestricted flight profile. In addition to 
aggressive low-level flying tactics, a variety of on-board 
equipment and systems served to protect the PAVE LOW 
from the inevitable dangers lurking in hostile territory. To 
defend against threats at the objective, any combination of 
Figure 17. Nose-mounted sensor package 
Figure 18. MH-53J maneuvers at 
 low-level, high speed 
Figure 16. MH-53 being loaded onto a C-5B Galaxy 
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three GAU-2B/A 7.62 mm miniguns or GAU-18/A .50 cal machine guns were mounted one each 
in the port window, starboard crew door and rear ramp. Chaff and flare dispensers were mounted 
at various points on the airframe and AN/ALQ-157 IR jammers were placed strategically on top 
of each gull wing to defeat incoming heat-seeking missiles. In addition, a comprehensive 
Electronic Warfare (EW) suite was fitted to counter other threats. Even with the vast array of 
sophisticated on-board systems and sensors, close and continuous crew coordination was 
absolutely essential in PAVE LOW operations. In the early days of the PAVE LOW I test 
program, twenty-five experienced HH-53 pilots were interviewed as part of a 10-month study to 
identify operational CSAR problems relating to cockpit controls, displays and crew station areas. 
Results of this study were assessed to determine their impact on operational mission 
effectiveness. Since that time, crew coordination and training was perfected to a synergistic level 
in which crews placed total trust in one another in order to survive and accomplish the mission. 
While pilots concentrated on flying and navigating to and from the objective, they relied heavily 
on the lead flight engineer – seated between and slightly behind them – to monitor aircraft and 
system performance throughout the mission. When approaching the objective and once on-scene, 
a second flight engineer would swap between operating the 600 lb capacity rescue hoist and 
providing defensive fire suppression from his position in the starboard crew door as needed. The 
port side of the helicopter was defended by a dedicated aerial gunner through a cabin window 
behind the cockpit. The tail gunner provided suppressive fire for the rear sector of the helicopter, 
along with a significant portion on either side, from the open rear ramp. 
Figure 19. Nighttime rescue exercises using a hoist 
The establishment of integrated crews, a 
battle-proven concept since the days of World War 
II, was practiced among the PAVE LOW 
community and was proven to significantly 
enhance their combat effectiveness and 
survivability. The extremely low altitudes which 
comprised the PAVE LOW’s primary operating 
environment made situational awareness by all 
crewmembers a critical element in mission 
accomplishment, particularly since approximately 95% of all PAVE LOW missions were flown 
at night. A true team effort became paramount when arriving at the rescue site and entering into a 
hover or landing to retrieve personnel in total black-out conditions. While on-scene, the use of 
night vision goggles by the crew was an absolute necessity to ensure visual awareness of ground 
obstacles such as trees, rocks, electrical power lines or other hazards. During “brownout” 
landings (where sand and dirt are recirculated by the main rotor rendering visibility severely 
degraded) the verbal crew coordination among the co-pilot, flight engineer and crew was of 
paramount importance to the pilot who carefully landed the aircraft. The role of the MH-53 in 
the brownout problem is discussed in section 3.7.4. 
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3.6 “PAVE LOW Leads” 
While supporting various operations around the world throughout the 1980s, such as 
Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, PAVE LOW crews became very adept at their job and 
were soon recognized throughout the military as some of the best in the business. Their 
reputation as such made them and their aircraft 
some of the most sought-after assets in the 
U.S. military inventory. This accolade came to 
the fore in 1991 when the PAVE LOW was 
selected to lead the initial strike package into 
Iraq to initiate Operation Desert Storm. In 
order for coalition air forces to successfully 
penetrate Iraqi air defenses and destroy key 
targets with the best chances of success, it was 
necessary to open a sizeable gap in the Iraqi 
air defense radar network on the Iraqi/Saudi 
Arabian border. Although the McDonnell 
Douglas (now Boeing) AH-64A Apache attack 
helicopter could bring plenty of firepower to bear 
on the targets, it was not adequately equipped (at 
the time) to accurately navigate the vast, 
featureless desert terrain of Southwest Asia for 
long distances. Therefore, it was decided that a 
task force of Apaches would be led in tight 
formation by a pair of MH-53Js using their highly-
accurate Global Positioning System (GPS) and INS 
equipment. The unparalleled accuracy of the on-
board systems allowed crews to arrive on-scene 
within plus or minus 30 seconds of the scheduled 
time. Acting as pathfinders, the PAVE LOW crews 
would drop chemical light sticks at pre-determined 
waypoints along the route to the target, allowing the Apache crews to update their on-board 
Doppler navigation systems accordingly. In the early morning hours of January 17, the mission 
took place exactly as planned with the Apaches reaching their objective and scoring direct hits 
on the radar and communications sites, opening a 20-mile corridor for coalition strike aircraft. 
The flawless execution of this critical mission played a pivotal role in the success of the war, 
inspiring PAVE LOW crews to adopt the self-assured motto, “PAVE LOW Leads.” 
After leading the very first mission of the 1991 Gulf War, the PAVE LOW performed 
countless other missions, many of which remain shrouded in secrecy even today. Along with the 
clandestine insertion and extraction of Special Operations Forces throughout the theater of 
operations, the PAVE LOW also took part in some highly publicized operations, one of which 
was the rescue of a downed U.S. Navy fighter pilot: the recovery of Lieutenant Devon Jones was 
noteworthy not only for having been performed under enemy fire in broad daylight, but also for 
being the first successful Air Force CSAR mission since the Vietnam War. Soon after the Gulf 
War of 1991, PAVE LOW crews again found themselves in the forefront of regional conflict in 
places such as Liberia, Haiti and various other locations. When war erupted in the Balkans in 
Figure 20. MH-53J during Operation Desert Storm 
Figure 21. Combat rescue of downed Navy pilot 
in Iraq—January 21, 1991 
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1995, PAVE LOWs were some of the first Air Force assets placed on alert as Operation 
Deliberate Force commenced. A few years later, during Operation Allied Force, they were 
involved in the high-profile rescue on March 28, 1999 of the pilot of a downed Lockheed  
F-117A Nighthawk who evaded capture in Serbian-held territory for more than six tense hours. 
Two months later, a PAVE LOW rescued the pilot of a downed Lockheed Martin F-16C 
Fighting Falcon, evading heavy enemy fire for two hours in the process. Aside from performing 
the traditional CSAR mission, PAVE LOWs carried out numerous Special operations missions in 
support of troops operating deep behind enemy lines during operations in the Balkans. 
3.7 PAVE LOW IV: The Last Generation 
After a number of upgrades and improvements over the years, the PAVE LOW appeared 
in its final variant as the MH-53M PAVE LOW IV. Initiated in 1997, the PAVE LOW IV 
program aimed to provide the aircraft with enhanced threat detection and defensive capabilities 
while providing crews with improved situational awareness of the battlefield. Modification of the 
aircraft, twenty-five in total, took place between 1999 and 2001.The primary internal difference 
in the Model was the addition of the Interactive Defensive Avionics System / Multi-mission 
Advanced Tactical Terminal (IDAS/MATT). This advanced system provided crews with near 
real-time intelligence and threat information from various off-board sensors, allowing them to 
update their flight profile en route and more effectively avoid known air defenses. 
A color, multifunctional, night-vision compatible digital map screen is the most visible 
hardware in the IDAS/MATT. Located on the helicopter's instrument panel, the display gave an 
MH-53 crew a clearer picture of the 
battlefield. Crews were provided with access 
to near real-time events, including the 
aircraft’s flight route, man-made hazards such 
as power lines, and even enemy electronic 
threats that were "over-the-horizon." The 
system worked by coded satellite 
transmissions to the helicopter's computer that 
were then decoded. The data from the screen 
provided a perspective of potential threats and 
their lethal threat radius. Besides the map 
display, a navigational display provided digital 
course and bearing information with the push 
of a button. The heart of the system - advanced 
software - included an integrated electronic 
warfare system, infrared (IR) countermeasure 
controls (including missile warning), radar warning and jammer inputs, as well as chaff and flare 
countermeasures, all of which were monitored on one display. Crews received instant cautions 
and advisories on threats with immediate recommendations, including when to dispense 
countermeasures. 
With IDAS/MATT, if the computer sensed a threat, it anticipated the threat with a direct 
action the crew could take. It sensed the problem and offered the crew a way to solve it 
instantaneously. The entire system was designed with the crew member as a priority in 
consolidating a variety of functions. Special attention was made to display visible instrument 
Figure 22. MH-53M Pave Low IV deploys flares 
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panel functions with easy console access while increasing the efficient flow of information. In a 
battlefield situation, concise and near real-time information is perhaps an aircrew's most valuable 
asset. With IDAS/MATT, the probability of being detected by the enemy was greatly reduced. 
The system was also readily transferred to other Special operations platforms and is included in 
the CV-22B Osprey. 
The IDAS/MATT upgrade program incorporated the PL IV aircraft system onto the PL 
III simulation network. This upgrade made possible the software maintenance of the operational 
flight programs of the MH-53M weapon system. With IDAS/MATT, the MH-53M was the 
world's most software-intensive and technologically-sophisticated helicopter. Hardware changes 
included updating the user interface function to reflect PL IV cockpit changes and the addition of 
an Embedded Computer Systems Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) rack to host PL IV-unique 
LRUs. Software changes included the modification of 10 existing LRU simulations. In addition, 
the flight, visual scene driver, and terrain/target simulations were modified. Software block 
cycle-change/cycle-time dramatically dropped with the Extendable Integration Support 
Environment upgrade.  
In the early spring of 2000, heavy, continuous rainfall in the southeast part of Africa 
caused severe devastation and loss of life. Particularly hard hit was the country of Mozambique. 
The WR-ALC/LU Directorate played a substantial supporting role in the relief efforts for that 
Southeast African nation. On March 2, 2000, the DoD authorized U.S. military forces in Europe 
to provide logistical and humanitarian relief support to the area through Operation Silent 
Promise. The DoD also authorized the 352 SOG from RAF Mildenhall UK to deploy up to six 
MH-53M helicopters for the relief effort. Only five were actually needed. 
In FY02, WR-ALC employees upgraded two of the remaining MH-53Js to MH-53M 
configuration with kits left over from the original IDAS/MATT program. At the end of FY02, 
the fleet size stood at 11 MH-53Js and 25 MH-53Ms, due to two losses during Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). Plans called for the remaining MH-53Js to be converted to MH-53M 
configuration beginning with a FY03 new start in compliance with the PMD direction. Officials 
also anticipated the fielding of a new MH-53M configuration calculated to correct system 
obsolescence and vanishing vendor issues that exist with the currently fielded IDAS/MATT 
equipment. Experts decided not to add any new capabilities. They expected these modifications 
to correct existing production deficiencies. Once the new configuration was designed, tested, and 
fielded on the 11 MH-53Js, the original 25 MH-53Ms would be upgraded in the out years to the 
new common configuration. Upon program completion, HQ AFSOC would have a fleet of 36 
operational aircraft in the same IDAS/MATT configuration. 
3.7.1 MH-53M Mission Capable Rate   
During recent years, all MH-53 stakeholders realized that the MH-53M Mission Capable 
(MC) rate and Aircraft Availability rate were critical performance metrics for determining 
whether HQ AFSOC and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) would have the fully-
operational aircraft available to meet National Command Authority (NCA) taskings. As such, the 
SOF SPO, HQ AFSOC, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), depot repair organizations, and 
suppliers had worked very hard with remarkable results that assured sustainment of outstanding 
MC rates. From 1997 to 2000, the average MC rate increased from 56 percent to 80 percent. 
However, this MH-53M MC rate and Aircraft Availability could not be maintained at that level 
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without the funding of operational and sustainment modifications. Between 1999 and 2002, the 
MH-53J/M fleet MC rate averaged 80 percent, with the highest monthly MC rate reaching 86.9 
percent. Driven by the universal belief among the MH-53 work force that no detail was too 
small, the MH-53M MC rate success had been attained through vigorous supply chain 
management which employed thorough use of military supply sources, use of commercial 
vendors, search of international markets, review of reclamation venues, and ingenious repair 
efforts. 
Just as the development of the entire prototype helicopter helped reduce cost and risk in 
the MH-53 program, competitive prototyping of subsystems and components also helped reduce 
risk and cost in the program. Nearly every subsystem added to the PL was prototyped and tested 
at Hurlburt Field FL. These subsystems included radios, guns, navigation aids, etc. AFSOC 
developed a formal test flight for the PL with AFOTEC (Air Force Operational Test and 
Evaluation Center) as well as a DT&E (Developmental Test and Evaluation) group. They also 
received outstanding support from both government and contractor repair facilities as well as the 
hard working men and women on the flight lines and back shops at all Air Force PAVE LOW 
operating locations. 
In FY02, increased operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) invoked by OEF resulted in an 
inordinate number of repairs. In some cases, this meant repairing gearboxes in just eight months, 
a task which would normally be done in three years during peacetime. During FY02, pieces and 
parts (gears, splines, bearings, gaskets, shafts, seals) for gearboxes were in short supply. These 
gearboxes were last manufactured in quantity in the mid-1980s. Many of the piece part vendors 
had gone out of business, while the MH-53M industrial base had shut down. Moreover, the 
remaining Navy CH-53E vendors did not manufacture equipment suitable for the essentially 
1960s-vintage MH-53M. The only way to get piece part vendors back into production again was 
to place a substantial order. The SOF SPO recommended the order be for 41 complete sets of the 
gearbox assemblies placed with Sikorsky Aircraft Inc. (United Technologies Corporation) 
Headquarters in Stratford, Connecticut, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The SOF 
SPO concluded that once the piece part vendors resumed business operations, there would be 
sources for piece part procurement to support future repair requirements. 
3.7.2 AN/AAQ-24(V) Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM)  
The AN/AAQ-24(V) Directed Infrared 
Countermeasures (DIRCM) program was one of U.S. 
Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) highest 
priority acquisition programs. This urgently-needed 
aircraft self-protection suite provided fast and accurate 
threat detection, processing, tracking, and countermeasures 
to defeat current and future generation infrared missile 
threats. DIRCM was designed for installation on a wide 
range of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. For 
USSOCOM, the system was installed on all of Air Force 
Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC’s) AC–130 
gunships and MC–130 Combat Talon aircraft. A laser-
based jamming capability was developed and shortly 
thereafter installed on the MH-53M. Additionally, 
Figure 23. AN/AAQ-24(V) DIRCM 
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installation of the DIRCM system integrated a fully automatic mode to the chaff and flare 
dispenser system to more effectively counter radar-directed and IR-based threats. 
3.7.3  PLs Undergo Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) Enhancements 
As a low-density/high-demand asset, the PAVE LOW was one of the most highly-tasked 
platforms in the Air Force. In total, only 41 airframes received the PAVE LOW modification. Its 
heavy use in all theaters of operation around the globe was taxing on the airframe. To maximize 
its usefulness and longevity, the entire PAVE LOW inventory underwent a SLEP beginning in 
the mid-1990s, receiving numerous upgrades and new components. The purpose of the MH-53 
SLEP was to expand the operational gross weight capability and enhance the structural integrity 
of the MH-53J PL III. The SLEP saw an increase in the gross weight (GW) from 42,000 to 
50,000 lbs in order to provide a capable air vehicle beyond the year 2000.7
Key air vehicle elements of the MH-53J PL III SLEP, which included the addition of 
Shipboard Operations (SBO) features, were: 
 CSAR operational 
requirements were also addressed to meet the future DoD long-range helicopter needs. This 
SLEP enhanced the ability of the MH-53J to deploy to extreme ranges at maximum GW which 
allows for a limited number of weapon systems to be strategically based. Extensive airframe 
modifications were also accomplished at the Naval Aviation Depot in Pensacola. 
• Improved main rotor blades 
• Elastomeric main rotor head 
• T-64-GE-100 engines 
• Increased strength accessory gearbox support structure 
• Automatic tail pylon fold system for SBO 
• RH-53D main landing gear  
• Stronger alloy tail pylon skins 
• Structural enhancements in the aft fuselage upper/side skins 
• Improved/replaced aircraft electrical wiring system 
• New aircraft hydraulic tubing 
• Exhaust cooler for auxiliary power plant  
• Collective damper 
The SLEP not only allowed the PAVE LOW to continue flying despite its considerable age, 
but it also provided enhanced mission capabilities. Having seen its first major conflict during 
Operation Allied Force in 1999, the PL IV again entered large-scale combat when the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) began at the start of OEF in Afghanistan in September 2001. Eighteen 
months later, when the invasion of Iraq occurred in March 2003, the PAVE LOW was again at 
the forefront of combat during OIF. Both of these conflicts were significant for their heavy 
emphasis on Special operations, a task for which the PAVE LOW and its crews proved 
immensely effective. As in previous conflicts, the PAVE LOW was often – not surprisingly – 
one of the first assets present within a given theater of operations. 
Effective systems engineering planning of the SLEP for the PAVE LOW program (1) 
extended the usability of the weapon system into the 21st century which enabled it to play a 
crucial role in the GWOT starting in 2001, and (2) allowed the PAVE LOW to remain viable 
until its replacement, the CV-22B, could be fielded. 
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3.7.4 Beating Brownout on the PL IV  
Between 1985 and 2005, the Air Force experienced Seven Class A (and B) mishaps in 
their H-53 aircraft due to rotary-wing brownout (RWB).8 Until recently, a Class A mishap was 
defined as a mishap in which there was $1M or more in damage to the aircraft or death/ 
permanent total disability of the aircrew. A Class B mishap was a mishap with greater than 
$200K but less than $1M in damages or a permanent partial disability to the aircrew.v
All of the U.S. armed services consider landings in dense, recirculating dust, sand, or 
snow a hazard to helicopters and tilt-rotors.
  
9
In 2006, the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) initiated a study 
program directed at reducing or 
eliminating the RWB problem. RWB is 
the condition that results when a 
helicopter lands in an arid environment 
and the rotors recirculate sand and dust 
such that visibility out of the cockpit is 
severely reduced. The MH-53M 
program figured prominently in the 
RWB study. Four AFSOC aircrew 
members were attending the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) in 2005-6 and were engaged in the study by then-Major Lee 
Anderson (co-author of this Case Study). The foursome was able to develop the evaluation 
criteria for the RWB technology developed during the study. Anderson and the others were able 
to develop specific criteria for landing in degraded visual environments including brownout. 
Blinding sand and dust clouds churned up by helicopter rotors still cost the U.S. armed services 
lives and aircraft in ongoing conflicts. Since 2002, the Army alone has lost or damaged 27 
helicopters in brownout mishaps. Recently, a Special Operations MH-47 Chinook hit a hidden 
obstacle on takeoff and crashed, resulting in 10 fatalities. 
 The Office of the Under Secretary for Defense 
Installations and Environment notes 
brownout mishaps cost more than $100 
million per year and accounted for a 
third of all helicopter accidents in OEF 
and OIF. 
The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps likewise have suffered losses operating at 
unprepared sites in dense, recirculating dust.10
                                               
 
vEffective 1 October 2009 Class A: Total cost of damages in an amount of $2 million or more; or 
destruction of a DoD aircraft; or injury/occupational illness resulting in fatality; or permanent total disability. Class 
B: Total cost of damages in an amount of $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million; or injury/occupational illness 
resulting in permanent partial disability; or hospitalization of three or more personnel as a result of a single accident. 
 Better crew training and improved cockpit 
symbology and flight controls have provided some help in addressing the common threat of 
brownout. Singly, and in partnership, the services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
 
Figure 24. Onset of Rotary-Wing Brownout conditions 
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Agency (DARPA) meanwhile are pursuing advanced see-through, see-and-remember, and 
combination technologies for safe landings in desert dust. 
Cuing symbology also works with integrated flight controls to enhance stability in 
brownout. The AFSOC upgraded MH-53M PL IV and HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters with an 
Altitude Hold Hover Stabilization system and improved cockpit symbology. Marine MV-22B 
and Air Force CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft have flight path vector displays that let crews 
make brownout landings manually with cues on the hover indicator or automatically using the 
fly-by-wire hover-hold function. 
Hover symbology and enhanced flight controls nevertheless do nothing to avoid landing 
zone (LZ) obstacles hidden by dust clouds. In 2006, AFRL tested the Photographic Landing 
Augmentation System for Helicopters (PhLASH) on an MH-53M PL IV. Applied Minds Inc., of 
Glendale, California, built a gimbaled, 16 mega-pixel camera with an IR strobe and laser 
rangefinder to image the LZ before entering the cloud. The pilot saw a clear picture of the LZ as 
it existed 20 to 30 seconds before landing, geo-registered on the real world with a GPS receiver 
and inertial measurement unit. The see-and-remember PhLASH had the resolution to spot small 
obstacles but could not show hazards entering the LZ after brownout occurred.11
AFRL brownout researchers concluded that laser radar (LADAR) could provide far better 
spatial resolution than Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar to spot LZ obstacles. The 3D-LZ (Three-
Dimensional Landing Zone) collaboration by AFRL and AFDD (AeroFlight Dynamics 
Directorate at NASA Ames) integrated LADAR with an intuitive BrownOut Symbology System 
(BOSS). The LADAR updated a dynamic navigation database that showed pilots color-enhanced 
obstacles. BOSS cues developed by AFDD consolidated and improved elements of BSAU 
(Brownout Situational Awareness Upgrade) symbology to give pilots essential flight parameters 
with reduced workload. The 3D-LZ landings touched down at 0 to 1 knots, with descent rates 
less than 50 feet per minute. Test pilot and AFDD flight projects office chief Lt Colonel Steve 
Braddom noted, “They weren’t the typical aggressive landings you see in brownout.” 
 The goal of the 
AFRL RWB study was to develop a “see-through” capability. 
To provide a true multi-purpose helicopter sensor, AFRL researchers envision 3D-LZ 
laser technology integrated with navigation FLIR. Sandblastervi
  
 program managers, meanwhile, 
consider Sandblaster “sensor-agnostic” and compatible with a mix of imaging technologies. 
Additionally, DARPA is working with USSOCOM and Army aviation leaders to transition the 
technology to a production brownout aid. The technology came along too late for the PL IV, 
however, the PAVE LOW mission helped initiate the technology needed for the RWB system 
which will be a valuable asset on other rotary-wing aircraft. 
                                               
 
viSandblaster is the program name given to a DARPA program whose goal was to reduce, if not eliminate, degraded 
visual effects of brownout in helicopters. 
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3.8 From the Battlefield to the “Boneyard” 
Given adequate funding and no end in 
sight for the PAVE LOW mission, the Air Force 
had originally planned to retain the aircraft in 
service possibly as late as 2014. However, the 
inevitable rise in maintenance costs and the 
increasing number of maintenance man-hours 
required per flight hour to keep the PAVE LOW 
flying took its toll. The MH-53M, like all 
previous variants, was equipped with the vintage 
radar and FLIR with which the PAVE LOW had 
originally entered service, and lacked IR engine 
exhaust suppressors. This resulted in not only 
having the highest maintenance requirements in 
the entire AFSOC aircraft inventory, but it also posed a significant vulnerability to shoulder-fired 
surface-to-air missiles. Additionally, ever-increasing reductions in funding meant that the PL IV 
program turned out to be the last major upgrade of the type. Even as the first MH-53J was retired 
on January 4, 2007, the PAVE LOW remained a highly effective, fully mission-capable platform 
with no operational flight restrictions, and the airframe had no structural fatigue problems. Even 
as late as June 2008, PAVE LOW crews were engaged in low-level flight training in the 
mountains and valleys surrounding Roanoke, Virginia. The final operational combat mission for 
the PAVE LOW took place on September 26, 2008, during a logistical resupply and passenger 
movement mission supporting Special Operations Forces in central and southern Iraq as part of 
OIF, bringing an end to a distinguished career of nearly 30 years. Fittingly, the mission took 
place under the cover of total darkness. 
Like many before them, most of the 
last PAVE LOWs to see action were 
transported directly from the theater of 
operations to the 309th Aerospace 
Maintenance and Regeneration Group (309 
AMARG), affectionately known as the 
“Boneyard,” adjacent to Davis-Monthan AFB, 
Arizona. Those that were not taken to the 
Boneyard found their way to museums around 
the country, ensuring their place in history as a 
symbol of freedom and the heroes they 
supported. As the drawdown of the PAVE 
LOW occurred, some units chose to 
commemorate the service of this remarkable 
aircraft with formal ceremonies honoring the 
type. One of those, the 20th Special Operations Squadron (20 SOS), held the distinctive honor of 
being the last unit to operate the PAVE LOW. A formal retirement ceremony, attended by scores 
of military and civilian guests, was held on October 17, 2008, at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Pilots, 
aircrew members, maintainers and various others who were involved with the PAVE LOW at 
Figure 25. Final Pave Low mission—September 26, 
2008 
Figure 26. Retired Pave Low in outdoor storage at 
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 
 
 
33 
one time or another all gathered to bid a fond farewell to the machine they knew and admired. In 
the Hurlburt Field Air Park, an MH-53M now sits immortalized on permanent display. 
 
Figure 27. Formal PAVE LOW retirement ceremony—October 17, 2008 
Figure 28. Bell Boeing CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor 
As the decision was made to retire the PAVE 
LOW and the type was gradually withdrawn from 
service, the Air Force endeavored to introduce the 
Bell Boeing CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor into full 
operational service as a partial replacement for the 
PAVE LOW. While the Osprey’s superior speed and 
range allow it to perform long-range 
infiltration/exfiltration and resupply, differences in 
flight profile, performance, and capability as compared to the PAVE LOW have not allowed it to 
fill completely the void left behind by the MH-53J/M. Instead, the remainder of the PAVE LOW 
mission is now carried out by Army Special Operations helicopters such as the Boeing MH-
47E/G Chinook.   
Figure 29. Boeing MH-47E Chinook (Special Operations Variant) 
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4 Conclusion 
The Sikorsky MH-53 PAVE LOW III helicopters were originally HH-53B/C Super Jolly 
Green Giants, or “Super Jollies,” used by the U.S. Air Force in the Vietnam War. The 
requirement to perform combat rescue missions during periods of darkness before the 
introduction of night vision technology drove several attempts to modify the H-53. After several 
unsuccessful attempts, the PAVE LOW III program successfully developed an effective design 
which included advanced inertial and Doppler navigation systems, a Forward-Looking Infrared 
(FLIR) sensor, automated hover stabilization and Terrain-Following/Terrain-Avoidance (TF/TA) 
radar. Eight operational HH-53C aircraft were modified and became known as the HH-53H 
PAVE LOW III capable of flying low level missions at night and in adverse weather. The 
success of this program eventually led to the evolution of all 41 HH-53 aircraft in the USAF to 
the MH-53J PAVE LOW III enhanced configuration. These aircraft were designated for Special 
operations and were subsequently given Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation systems, 
improved engines and rotor blades as well as structural reinforcement to extend the life of the 
airframes and increase the maximum operating weights during the 1980s. The MH-53J became 
famous during Desert Storm when used to lead AH-64 aircraft to conduct initial strikes against 
Iraqi surface to air missile systems and enable to start of the air war. During the late 1990s the 
aircraft received another major upgrade to the avionics including improved defensive systems 
integration, a color digital map display and a satellite intelligence receiver to improve situational 
awareness and survivability. These modified aircraft were now designated MH-53M and were 
informally known as PAVE LOW IV and first saw combat employment in Kosovo. Throughout 
its lifespan, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) employed the PAVE LOW to 
conduct long-range, low-level insertion, extraction and resupply of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) from all branches of the US military. 
An effective systems engineering plan for system modifications and upgrades via the 
SLEP extended the life of the aircraft while enhancing its usability. Originally designed for a  
10-year service life, some of the modified H-53 aircraft had tail numbers ranging from 66 (built 
in 1966) to the early 70s. The PAVE LOW SLEP helped keep the weapon system viable for an 
additional 15-20 years with final retirement in 2008. 
Indisputably, the PAVE LOW 
established a solid and well-deserved 
reputation for performance and 
reliability among its crews and 
maintainers. Its high mission-ready rate 
was a testament not only to the 
hardworking maintenance crews, but 
also to the sheer ruggedness of the H-53 
airframe. Having performed countless 
clandestine military operations across 
the globe, ranging from the small-scale 
conflicts of the 1980s to the recent 
liberation of Iraq and the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, the PAVE LOW will be 
remembered as a true warrior. The “cloak-and-dagger” nature of Special operations dictates that 
many of the missions undertaken by the PAVE LOW and her valiant crews will remain shrouded 
in secrecy for years to come. Eventually, when these missions are one day made public, the true 
Figure 30.Overwater flight of an MH-53M at dusk 
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valor and bravery inherent in the PAVE LOW community will be revealed. In addition to its 
secretive wartime role, the PAVE LOW provided valuable assistance in peacetime disaster relief 
and humanitarian support missions in numerous places around the world. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, PAVE LOWs provided airlift for equipment, supplies and personnel in the 
massive relief effort. A case in point, less than one month prior to retirement, a PAVE LOW was 
placed on standby in September 2008 to assist the U.S. Coast Guard on a mission to rescue the 
crew of a Cyprus flagged freighter adrift in the Gulf of Mexico in the midst of Hurricane Ike. 
Despite being a conversion of an existing platform rather than one built for the mission from the 
ground up, the PAVE LOW had no peer in nighttime low-level penetration capability. The 
PAVE LOW was viewed by many as the premier CSAR and Special operations helicopter, a 
sentiment enthusiastically shared by virtually all who flew it. Indeed, many crewmembers, both 
newcomers and seasoned veterans, have proclaimed that the PAVE LOW was – and will remain 
– the absolute peak of their career. Even in retirement, the PAVE LOW leaves behind a legacy as 
the largest, most powerful and most technologically advanced helicopter ever to fly in the Air 
Force inventory. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Gene Becker, Commander of the 20th 
Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron (20 ESOS) in Iraq which flew the final PAVE LOW 
combat mission, “She goes out, as she came in – the very best.” 
 
Figure 31. MH-53M PAVE LOW IV, National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Dayton, Ohio 
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Appendix A A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
 
This Friedman-Sage matrix is included as an exercise for the student. Following the explanation 
in Section 1.5 of this Case Study develop 4-6 systems engineering learning principles from the case study 
and then insert them into the matrix based on whether they were a contractor responsibility, a government 
responsibility, or a shared responsibility between the government and the contractor. 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor Responsibility 2. Shared Responsibility 3. Government Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
   
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem 
Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface 
Integration 
   
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post 
Deployment 
   
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management 
   
I. System and Program 
Management 
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training, range support, aircrew life support, and joint liaisons. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson 
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improve combat effectiveness for Special operations vertical lift aircraft. Anderson was a 
member of the AFRL Rotary-Wing Brownout (RWB) Integrated Study Team from 2006-
2008. He and his AFIT colleagues developed the Systems Engineering Plan for the AFRL 
Integrated RWB study and helped define the criteria for performing safe landings in 
Degraded Visual Environments. 
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Appendix C: 1970 ROC 
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Appendix D: 1974 PMD 
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Appendix E: AN/APQ-158 TF/TA Radar 
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Appendix F: PMD 1977 
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